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Abstract. The study investigates the role of financial development in boosting the investment ef-
ficiency of firms’ investments in China. Using a large sample of firm-level financial data and country 
level economic data over the period 2004–2015, present study creates a link between financial and 
real economy. Firms are priori classified into under- or over-invested and effect of financial develop-
ment is analyzed individually on each classification by using panel data estimations. The research 
concludes that firms suffering from under- (over-) investment problem due to financing constraints 
(agency problem), are more likely to increase (decrease) their investment` in the response of un-
derlying financial development in the economy. This study has demonstrated a novel approach by 
concurrently incorporating the monitoring and financing issues that disturb the optimal level of 
investments. Moreover, the findings give strong implications by suggesting and empirically proving 
the remedy that has the potential to balance the investment distortions by rectifying monitoring 
and financing deficiencies.  
Keywords: financial constraints, agency problem, under investment, over investment, financial 
development, information asymmetry,  China. 
JEL Classification: G10, G20, G30, G31, G32, O16. 
Introduction
There is enough evidence suggesting the existence of cyclical effect of financial variables over 
real variables. Love and Zicchino (2006) advocates the prophecy that classical dichotomy of 
real and financial variables should no longer exist after emergence of information asymmetry 
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theory. Economic development is the outcome of entrepreneurial activity, which is boosted 
by investments. Likewise, corporate decisions affect the growth path of the economy or vice 
versa. Unlike the neoclassical theory of investment, literature based on asymmetric informa-
tion and agency conflicts, emphasizes the role played by moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems in a firm’s investment decisions (Love 2003; Love, Zicchino 2006; Guariglia, Yang 
2016; Guariglia, Liu 2014). In a perfect capital environment, investments remain unaffected 
of financing decisions (Modigliani, Miller 1958). But in reality, investments are adversely 
affected by distortions, which includes both under- and over-investments (Hubbard 1998). 
There are two reasons behind investment distortions: one is agency issue and the other is 
asymmetric information. Since economists started to look at real phenomena abstracting 
from M-M model, a vast literature has been developed on the discussion of distortions in 
investment decisions in relation with real information asymmetry and agency cost; the for-
mer is likely to produce financing constraints and the latter is likely to produce monitoring 
issues. Here comes the role of development in financial system, which is expected to help the 
firms in investment decisions by providing needed capital flow and monitoring. 
Economic growth is dependent upon investing and financing activity which cannot be 
very successful without active role of financial institutions and financial markets. Financial 
development is identified by the ability of financial system (financial institutions, instruments 
and markets) to provide a mechanism to strengthen economic activity in an economy. It is 
also identified by an increase in the number of financial institutions and the enhancement 
of market capitalization and liquidity (Gurley, Shaw 1955). It helps the firms to boost their 
financial performance by strengthening their investment activity, which is achieved by mak-
ing the flow of capital smooth and providing vigorous monitoring and corporate governance 
system. The present study aims to explore this notion by identifying the impact of financial 
development on corporate level investment efficiency. We conduct it by priori classifying 
the firms on the basis of their under- or over-investment status because we do believe that 
financial development affects these two states differently.
We are taking Chinese economy as a case study because literature has demonstrated 
Chinese financial system as unique one (Lin, Su 2009). A lot of criticism reported is that 
its financial and legal system is weak and that its reliance is more on internal finance, trade 
credit and bank than on equity financing. And the inefficiency of state-owned banks mainly 
results from plenty of non-performing loans, mostly granted to massive unprofitable state-
owned enterprises. Even though Chinese stock market has grown tremendously beyond ex-
pectation, it is still relatively small compared with Chinese banking sector (Chen et al. 2001). 
Due to these and other political economic issues, Chinese financial markets are not acting as 
an efficient platform for Chinese firms to reduce financing constraints and causing under-
investment resultantly. Concurrently, given that the weak legal system and underdeveloped 
corporate governance mechanisms are prevailing in the economy, Chinese firms demonstrate 
severe agency problems leading to over-investment (Allen et al. 2005). For instance, govern-
ment nominees who look after the firms, may exploit their powers to over-invest in order to 
achieve their political objectives (Chen et al. 2001; Firth et al. 2012). The presence of financ-
ing constraints and agency issue at the same time in our sample economy makes our study 
more significant and fit to provide empirical evidence of our hypotheses.
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Our paper is related to as well as different from prior researches. We apply Richardson’s 
accounting-based constructs of over-investment and free cash flow to a large sample of Chi-
nese listed firms. We study both over-investment and under-investment, while Richardson 
(2006) focuses mainly on over-investment. (Guariglia, Yang 2016) and (Chen et al. 2016) also 
employed Richardson’s framework to measure over- and under-investment, but their concern 
remained towards the explanation of investment inefficiency in the combination of FCF and 
financing constraints. We go one step ahead by recommending remedy of investment ineffi-
ciency by development in financial system.  Our work is related to (Love, Zicchino 2006). But 
our paper is also different from Love’s paper in three aspects: First, Love studies 36 economies 
simultaneously, while we study only one economy, Chinese economy that is missing in Love’s 
sample countries. By this we have avoided cross-country heterogeneity. Secondly, Love did 
not address over- and under-investment. Thirdly, Love studied only information asymmetry. 
A recent study (Khan et al. 2017) has shown how overall investment efficiency is affected 
by financial development and sturucture in China. But this study did not consider the fact 
that investment behaviour of under-invested firms is likely to be different than that of over-
invested firms. Our study also fills this theoretical gap by providing empirical evidence. 
1. Hypothesis development
Richardson (2006) confirms agency cost explanation of over-investment. Agency issue results 
in the situation of over-investment in which firm’s controlling managers tend to invest FCF 
in negative NPV projects (Stulz 1990). Firms suffering form agency problem are more likely 
to do overinvestment (Guariglia, Yang 2016) due to overutilization of managerial discretion 
(Jensen 1986). In such circumstances, the more free cash flow they have, the more they pre-
fer to invest, which could lead to over-investment. This scenario is mostly created when the 
monitoring to management is weak, facilitates the management to do investment activities 
in projects, which serve management prospective rather than owners’. 
Asymmetric information between managers and fund providers results in credit ra-
tioning and ultimately financing constraints and then under-investments (Jensen 1986; 
Jensen, Meckling 1976; Myers, Majluf 1984). When firms try to get external financing by 
considering debt or equity, capital market imperfections are expected to create informa-
tion asymmetries that make it difficult for firms to raise external finance, due to widening 
of cost premium. Financing constraints induce the firm to overlook promising investment 
opportunities due to higher cost of capital, or make the feasible investments sensitive to 
internally generated cash flow due to its lower expected cost (Fazzari et al. 1988; Whited, 
Wu 2006; Hubbard 1998). 
Recently, (Guariglia, Yang 2016) and (Chen et  al. 2016) have studied the under- and 
over-investment behavior of Chinese firms, where they adopted the framework proposed by 
(Richardson 2006) to construct under- and over-investment as well as FCF firm-level mea-
sures. Their empirical results were consistent with the classical notions of (Jensen, Meckling 
1976; Myers, Majluf 1984) that managers will over-invest when they have abundant internal 
funds, but curtail investment when they require external financing (Jensen, Meckling 1976; 
Myers, Majluf 1984; Malmendier, Tate 2005). 
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Our study presents the notion that financial development in an economy helps to reach 
towards optimal investments by reducing the likelihood of investment distortions. Develop-
ment of financial institutions, instruments, and markets benefits the economy by enhancing 
the financial system, thereby increasing the flow of capital as well as a monitoring mechanism. 
This manuscript holds the view that financial development can help the firms to achieve op-
timal level of investments in two ways: (i) reducing agency cost by efficient monitoring, (ii) 
lowering financing constraints by increasing flow of capital. Literature related to financial 
development portrays that financial development can have an impact on the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of financial institutions, instruments and markets, which further affects corporate 
investments behavior. Financial development increases market efficiency and deepens market 
segmentation. By this, more flow of information becomes possible and facilitates investors 
to be more selective when they choose firms in which they would like to invest. Moreover, 
financial and legal system becomes mature and monitoring mechanisms are strengthened by 
strong corporate governance mechanism and developed legal system.  
As is illustrated above, financial development diverts the growth path of under- and 
over-investment towards optimal investment by different mechanisms. Under-investment 
is revoked by softening financing constraints and over-investment is repealed by efficient 
monitoring. A recent study conducted by (Castro et  al. 2015) holds the view that finan-
cial development is a significant determinant of firm investments. The study presents the 
conclusion that higher finance development generates opportunities for finance availability 
for firms, thus enabling the financially constrained firms to increase their investments. Ad-
ditionally, financial development increases market efficiency and allows investors to choose 
the firms more wisely for investing their funds. Therefore, firms, within the economy of less 
developed credit and capital markets, have fewer opportunities to expand due to unavail-
ability of required finances (Xie, Mo 2015).
As (Levine 1996) argues, development of financial system results in lowering the cost 
of monitoring because financial intermediaries apply enhanced techniques for gathering 
and processing information on potential borrowers and develop improved mechanisms for 
monitoring firm and managers’ performance. Financial development strengthens financial 
institutions and rating agencies emerge. Rating agencies also lower monitoring costs for the 
borrowers because rating firms can certify borrowers at a lower cost than financial intermedi-
aries. We link the proposition of Levine with Agency theory presented by (Jensen, Meckling 
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1976) which illustrates that when managers have excessive funds at their discretion, they will 
invest them irrationally, thus creating overinvestment problem.
This debate has inspired us to formulate the following hypotheses:
 – Under-investment hypothesis: Financial development is likely to turn under-invest-
ments towards optimal by mitigating financing constraints. 
 – Over-investment hypothesis: Financial development is likely to turn over-investments 
towards optimal by mitigating agency problem.
2. Methodology
2.1. Priori classification of firms on the basis of under- and over-investment
If NewI  is expenditures on new projects, it can be determined as: 
 o  ,New T tal MaintenanceI I I= −
where
  & ,Total t t tI CAPEX R D SalePPE= + −
 , , .Maintenance i t i tI Ammortization Depreciation= + ,
whereas TotalI  is total investment and is measured as sum of all outlays on capital expendi-
ture and research & development expenditures less receipt from sales of property, plant and 
equipment1; MaintenanceI  is maintenance investment defined as the expenditures to maintain 
assets in place; tCAPEX  are capital expenditures measured as cash paid to acquire and con-
struct fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets.; & tR D  is cash outflow for 
research and development purposes; tSalePPE  is cash inflow due to sales of property, plant 
and equipment. 
NewI  can be further split into expected investment expenditures in new positive net pres-
ent value (NPV) projects that is optimal investment ( )opNewI  and unwanted or abnormal in-
vestment expenditures ( )abNewI  that are investment distortions or under- and over-investment, 
the two types of investments that is below or above optimal investment level respectively. We 
use a dynamic investment expenditures model proposed by (Richardson 2006). That is an 
accounting based framework to predict optimal investment and abnormal investments. The 
predicted value from the expectation model is opNewI  and the residual value from expectation 
model is abNewI . Specifically, firm’s new investment expenditure .( )i tNewI  is function of Tobin’s 
Q, Size2, Age3,Stockreturns4 and Leverage5. 
 
. , 11 2 , 1 3 , 1




i t i tNew i New i t i t
i t i t i t
i t it
i t






=∂ + α +α +α +
α +α +α +
α + + + ε∑ ∑
    (1)
1 Richardson (2006) also included acquisition to calculate ITotal. But Guariglia, Yang (2016) has ex-
cluded it while calculating ITotal for Chinese firms because acquisitions expenses are already included 
in capital expenditures. 
2 Natural logarithm of total assets.
3 Number of years since listing
4 Measured as change in market value of firm over that in prior year.
5 Ratio of the sum of short-term and long-term debt to total assets.
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where the subscript i indexes firms and t indexes years (t = 2004–2015). We have taken 
lagged form of all our independent variables (except Age) to alleviate the simultaneity issue 
(Guariglia, Yang 2016; Duchin et al. 2010; Polk, Sapienza 2008). 
i
ind∑  and 
t
year∑  are vec-
tors for industry and year dummies to capture the fixed effect of respective indicators. Table 1 
represents the estimates of dynamic expectation model of investment expenditures. We use 
fixed-effect panel data estimator (FE) and GMM-system estimator to obtain estimates form 
Eq. (1). Then we use the residuals and fitted values obtained from dynamic expectation mod-





NewI  and optimal investments ,( )i t
op
NewI  respectively. For this 
purpose, we use the estimates obtained from GMM-system (Blundell, Bond 1998) estimator 
because this estimator helps us to control potential endogeneity of endogenous variables by 
using lagged levels of endogenous variables as instruments and eliminates firm specific effect. 
We have got almost same results as (Guariglia, Yang 2016) got for Chinese sample of firms. 
The only difference between our models is that we use stock returns at place of ROA6. Values 
6 Chen, X. et al. (2016) and Richardson, S. (2006) used stock returns in model of investment expenditures.
Table 1. Estimations of dynamic model of investment expenditures
Dependent Variable:
itNew
I Estimates by Fixed Effect Estimates by GMM-system
.
itNew
l I 0.230*** 0.780***
(0.007) (0.079)






,. i tl Stockreturns
0.005*** 0.036***
(0.001) (0.008)
,. i tl lev
–0.005*** 0.032***
(0.001) (0.005)
,. i tl lQ
0.005*** 0.013***
(0.000) (0.003)
,. i tl Age
–0.003*** –0.006***
(0.000) (0.001)
Year-fixed effect No yes
Industry fixed effect yes yes
R-sq 0.283
Observations 19259 19767








I Column 2 presents the estimates 
by fixed effect panel data model while column 3 presents estimates by system-GMM. Standard errors 
are reported in parenthesis below their respective estimated parameter. ***,** and * represents signifi-
cance at 1%, 5%and 10% respectively.
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of abNewI  may be positive or negative. These values are used to priori classify the firm-year 
observations into under- and over-investment. Over-investing (under-investing) firms are 





To analyze the sensitivities of under- or over-investment to financial development, we experi-
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NewI is abnormal investments. Its derivations and estimation have already been dis-
cussed in section 3.1. The ,i tCF  may indicate the effect of possible liquidity constraints on 
investment behavior; however it may also work as a proxy for potential future profitability. 






it Maintenance NewCF I I  (3)
Additionally, its interaction of financial development with cash flow variable − −1 1· )( it tCF FD  
targets to explore whether the increase in level of FD is related with the decrease in the level 
of dependence on internal funds. The reason behind this notion is that if a firm’s access 
to financial markets is restricted, it will rely on internal funds to support its investments. 
This helps us to identify that financial development in China facilitates the firms to lower 
their dependency on internally generated cash flows to cater future investment opportunities, 
which means our desired outcome is 4 0.α <  Among the country level economic variables in 
Eq. (2), we have also included ,gGDP  a measure to seize the impacts of economic growth on 
investment. Presence of gGDP  growth in model is meaningful to make it sure that financial 
development (FD) measures are capturing their own effects on sensitivity of under- and 
over-investments. 
FD may merely reflect the effect of economic growth on under- or over-investment if we 
don’t use gGDP  as control variable. The FD intends to determine the role of financial devel-
opment in controlling under- as well as over-investments. We use the following measures of 
financial development proposed by (Beck et al. 2001); who used them to find its relationship 
of FD with economic growth. Lately, Castro et al. (2015); Khan et al. (2017) used the same 
measures to find out the relationship between financial development and corporate invest-
ment decisions. 
The first variable of financial development is commonly identified in the literature as 
Financial Development Activity (FDa) and it represents a measure of the overall activity or 
liquidity of financial sector. It is defined as:
  log[ · ], t t tFDa BA VT=  (4)
where  tBA  &  tVT  represent bank advances and Value traded respectively. Bank advances 
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present not only an efficient flow of capital, but also a robust measure of monitoring over 
corporates7. Value traded is a robust indicator of stock market development as it indicates 
the degree of liquidity that stock market provides to corporates. 
To check the robustness of our results, we use two more alternative measures of financial 
development. To check the overall size of the development of financial system we employ a 
measure of Financial Development Size (FDs). It is defined as:
  log[ ], t t tFDs BA MC= +  (5)
where tBA  is bank advances and tMC is market capitalization, defined as ratio of the value 
of listed shares to GDP. To check the overall efficiency of financial development, we employ 
Financial Development Efficiency ratio (FDe), which measures the efficiency with which the 
financial sector channels funds in Chinese economy. It is defined as:
  log[ / ], t t tFDe VT OC=  (6)
where tVT  is the value traded and tOC is overhead costs and is defined as the accounting 
value of banks’ overhead costs as a share of banking system assets . Large overhead costs 
indicate the inefficiency of banking system and conveys the good proxy to measure the inef-
ficiency of banking system (Beck et al. 2001). 
2.3. Main features of data and descriptive statistics
The data used in this paper are drawn from the China Stock Market and Accounting Re-
search (CSMAR) Database and China Center for Economics Research (RESSET) Database. 
They cover Chinese companies that issue A-share stocks on either the Shanghai Stock Ex-
change (SHSE) or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), during the period 1994–20158. We 
exclude financial institutions since the operating, investing and financing activities of these 
firms are distinct from others. We further winsorize observations in the one percent tails for 
the main regression variables to minimize the potential influence of outliers. Finally, we drop 
all firms with less than three years of consecutive observations. All variables are deflated us-
ing the gross domestic product (GDP) deflator (derived from National Bureau of Statistics of 
China). Our final panel consists of 2486 listed firms, which corresponds to 22,713 firm–year 
observations. The number of firm–year observations of each firm varies from two to twelve, 
with number of observations varying from a minimum of 1271 in 2004 to a maximum of 
2462 in 2014. 
Table 2 presents the mean values of variables. When we compare the statistics of under-
invested firms with those of over-invested firms, we find interesting facts. Relative to total 
assets, the average total investment of over-invested firms is more than that of under-invested 
firms. Relative to total investment expenditures, new investments of over-invested firms are 
7 It should be noted that Beck et al. 2001 uses private credit (credit allocated to the private sector). We have replaced 
private credit with bank advances for two reasons. The first is that data for credit allocated by non-bank financial 
institutions were not available. Second is that private sector contributes a negligible portion of the total corporate 
sector to the Chinese economy. 
8 Our sample period is 2004 to 2015 as data for R&D expenditures prior to 2004 were unavailable. 
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4.17% more than the new investments of under invested firms. Interestingly, new investment 
shows up the 52.73% in under-invested firms and 56.9% in over-invested firms.
Figure 2 represents the graphical trend of market capitalization (MC), bank advances 
(BA) and value traded (VT) from year 2004 to 2015. MC is showing ups and downs through-
out our sample period. Overall trend shows the growth in market capitalization that started 
from 30% and reached up to 70% in 2015. The figure shows the drastic trend of bank advanc-
es. Starting from around 70% in 2004, it goes as lower as 65% and then shows the increasing 
Table 2. Analysis of mean values of under- and over-invested firm-year observations
Under-invested firms Over-invested firms All firms
itTotal
I .055 .058 .057
itNew
I .028 .033 .032
,i tCash .168 .183 .179
,i tSize 22.17 21.61 21.76
,i tStockreturns .567 .537 .546
,i tlev .505 .479 .486
,i tAge 9.91 8.07 8.56
,i tlQ 2.09 2.03 2.05
Observations 5969 16743 22712
Notes: It should be noted that a given firm that is suffering form under-investment in given year, may 
fall into over-investment in next year or vice versa, or it may maintain its under- or over-invested 
condition for many years with any change.
Figure 2. Graph representing the year trend of VT, BA & MC as share of GDP
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trend to reach about 90% in 2015. The graph shows the meander trend of value traded. It 
remained modest till 2012 and then becomes steep upward after 2012. 
3. Empirical results
Table 3 presents the estimated results of relationship between under- and over-investment 
and financial development measures. Our overlying hypothesis is that under-invested 
(over-invested) firms are likely to move towards optimal investment level by increasing 
(decreasing) investment expenditures in response to financial development in economy. 
For this, we expect positive (negative) direction of 3α  in case of under-invested (over-
invested) firms. As we expected, we have got the same results. FDa is significantly positive 
with under-invested firms, whereas it is significantly negative with over-invested firms. For 
robustness check, we also employ measures of FDs and FDe. These measures also support 
the results that we have already got with FDa. We do our estimation with both fixed effect 
panel data model and system-GMM. We do not find any significantly different results from 
both panel data estimations. 
Table 3. Estimates of under- and over-investment with financial development

















–0.016*** 0.753*** –0.016*** 0.778*** –0.016*** 0.773***
(0.005) 0.050 (0.005) 0.051 (0.005) 0.051
,i tCF
0.745*** 6.156*** 0.746*** 5.539*** 0.746*** 1.773
(0.131) 1.742 (0.131) 2.052 (0.131) 1.137
,i tFD
0.026* 0.140*** 0.003 0.053 0.000 0.000
(0.015) 0.056 (0.009) 0.041 (0.000) 0.000
tGDPg
–0.035 –0.079 –0.080*** –0.093** –0.078*** –0.116
(0.035) 0.059 (0.024) 0.041 (0.027) 0.058
, ,*i t i tFD CF
–4.979 –2.903 –0.089
1.866 1.517 1.249
Observations 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000
R-sq 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.114 0.000
Rhu 0.925 0.925
Sargan test  (p-value) 0.673 0.364 0.265
Serial Corr.
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First-order 0.043 0.086 0.099
Second-order 0.753 0.778 0.773

















–0.002 0.508*** –0.002 0.497*** –0.001 0.522***
0.005 0.047 0.005 0.046 0.005 0.048
,i tCF
1.047*** –2.064*** 1.049*** –1.679** 1.048*** –0.449
0.060 0.780 0.06 0.840 0.060 0.575
,i tFD
–0.022*** –0.107*** –0.000** –0.065*** –0.011*** –0.001***
0.008 0.024 0.000 0.017 0.005 0.000
tGDPg
–0.048*** –0.017*** –0.024* –0.014 –0.014 0.042***
0.018 0.031 0.013 0.022 0.012 0.029
, ,*i t i tFD CF
4.063 2.508*** 2.408
0.836 0.624 0.628
Observations 9129 9129 9129 9129 9129 9129
R-sq 0.041 0.040 0.040
Rhu
Sargan test (p-value) 0.365 0.873 0.365
Serial Corr.
First-order 0.087 0.063 0.034
Second-order 0.837 0.632 0.837





NewI Firms are priori classified into un-
der- and over invested firms on the basis of values of 
it
ab
NewI (calculated by Richardson 2006 accounting 
framework). Estimates were taken by fixed effect panel model and system-GMM. Standard errors are 
reported in parenthesis below their respective estimated parameter. ***,** and * represents significance 
at 1%, 5%and 10% respectively.
Accordingly, these findings signalize that financial development is a cure to treat invest-
ment distortions, whether it is due to financing constraints or agency problem. It affects un-
der- and over-invested phenomenon differently. Under-investments require smooth flow of 
capital that can only be obtained by resolving information asymmetry problem and thereby 
financing constraints. With the increase in the value of stock market trading volume (Value 
traded), market capitalization of equity market and credit allocated by credit markets, firms 
get financing comparatively more easily to cater their investment opportunities. For under-
invested firms, effect of financial development on investment comes from policies to increase 
credit level, market capitalization and stock market value traded, which improves financial 
environment and stimulates investment possibilities by reducing the cost of financing. It is 
plausible to consider that the more developed the financial system becomes, the greater the 
End of Table 3
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credit availability and the possibility of new financing will be, thus reducing the reliance of 
investment on internal cash flow for financially constrained firms. Over-investment that is 
more likely to be caused by agency issue is a result of under developed financial and legal 
system. With the development of financial institutions and markets, firms go under strict 
monitoring of investors and creditors. Increase in bank advances signal the credit worthiness 
of firms in economy. The increased market capitalization and value of trading not only give 
confidence to the investors but also make the firms frequently exposed to equity markets. 
4. Robustness tests
4.1. Estimations by alternative panel data technique






NewI  may follow ex-ante abnormal investment ,( . ).i t
ab
Newl I To take this 
problem into account, as a further robustness test, predicted abnormal investment is obtained 
using the fitted values from the model in Eq. (1) estimated in each year using OLS. Results 
reported in Table 4 are consistent with our prior findings: under invested (over-invested) 
firms are likely to increase (decrease) their investment expenditures in response to financial 
development. From now onwards, we represent only the coefficients of variables which are of 
our main interest now, for the sake of brevity and space problem9. Moreover, please note in 
all subsequent test results, ***,** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 4. OLS estimates of under- and over-investment with financial development: robustness tests
Dep Variable
FDa FDs FDe FDa FDs FDe
Under-ols Under-ols Under-ols Over-ols Over-ols Over-ols
,i tCF –.545*** –.546*** –.547*** .155*** .155*** .157***
,i tFD .0170*** .006*** .0002*** –.031*** –.012*** –.000***
, ,*i t i tFD CF .024 .023 .032 –1.344 –2.34 –.278





NewI Firms are priori classified into 




4.2. Estimation by using alternative ways of identifying under-  
and over-invested firms
The distinction between under-investment and over-investment based on (Richardson 2006) 
may also have some flaws (Bergstresser 2006). Alternatively, we priori classify the firms into 





I  We rank the values of firms’ 
.i tNew
I by magnitude in each industry, and 
categorize the firms as under-invested (over-invested) when the value of 
.i tNew
I  lies below 
(above) the median 
.i tNew
I  of relevant industry. We hypothesize that the firms, which are 
9 Complete results are available upon request. 
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over-invested, will increase the amount of investment expenditures in response to financial 
development and over-invested firms will react in the opposite direction. Results of sys-
GMM estimates given in Table 5 support our hypothesis. 
Table 5. GMM-system estimates of new investment expenditures with financial development:  
robustness tests
FDa FDs FDe FDa FDs FDe
Under-inv Under-inv Under-inv Over-inv Over-inv Over-inv
,i tCF .707*** (.099) –.219*** –2.48*** –2.88*** –.587***
,i tFD .016*** .001 .000* –.066*** –.048*** –.000***
, ,*i t i tFD CF –1.191* –.362* –.013*** 2.59*** 2.097*** .039***
Notes: Same as of Table 4.
Lastly, we use the approach proposed by (Bates 2005) to priori classify the firms on the 
basis of values of under- and over-investment and free cash flow. Following this approach, 





NewI  by taking the difference between firm’s .i tNewI  
and industry median 
.i tNew






spond to under- (over-) investments. Consistent with notions of our hypotheses, we find 
same results that we got from our baseline model. Results are reported in Table 6. 
Table 6. Estimates of H1 and H2 using Bates (2005) definitions of abnormal investment
FDa FDs FDe FDa FDs FDe
Under-inv Under-inv Under-inv Over-inv Over-inv Over-inv
,i tCF 10.27*** 3.29*** .682*** –.661*** .221 –.016
,i tFD .290*** .048*** .000*** –.025*** –.000 –.000*
, ,*i t i tFD CF –8.85*** –2.406*** –.046*** .787*** –.127 .005





NewI Firms are priori classified 
into under- and over invested firms on the basis of values of 
it
ab
NewI . Vales of . it
ab
Newl I are computed by 
approach propsed by Bates (2005).
4.3. Estimation by using alternative ways of identifying financial development
We also use the alternative measures of financial development to check the robustness of 
financial development measures. For this purpose, we follow the approach used by (Kim et al. 
2015), who adopt measures of stock market development and credit market development 
separately. The average of MKTCAP (ratio of total market value of all shares listed on SHSE 
and SZSE at the end of a year to GDP in the same year) and MKTLIQ (the ratio of the total 
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market value of all shares traded in a year to GDP in the same year), denoted by FINAVG 
is used to capture the effect of stock market development and CREDIT (ratio of annual to-
tal bank loans to GDP) is used to capture credit market development. Results presented in 
Table 7 support our prior results. 
Table 7.  (under- or over-)  investment with financial development: using Kim’s approach  
of determining FD
AVGFIN CREDIT
under over under over
,i tCF 1.17* .002 17.33*** –7.11***
,i tFD .037 –.037* .562*** –.300***
, ,*i t i tFD CF –2.06 .751 –20.6*** 9.014***





NewI Firms are priori classified 
into under- and over invested firms on the basis of values of 
it
ab
NewI . Vales of . it
Ab
Newl I are computed by 
approach propsed by Richardson (2006). AVGFIN and CREDIT are proxies for financial development 
(FD), that were computed by approach proposed by (Kim et al. 2015).
Conclusions
The study draws the conclusion that financial development is capable of creating a balance 
between under- and over-investment by rectifying financial constraints and agency problems. 
We note that issues of constrained flow of finances and weak controlling mechanisms can 
be overcome by the development of financial system in the economy, which could help the 
firms to move towards optimal investments. Findings implicitly urge the regulators to bring 
the development of the financial systems. The study contributes significantly to incorporating 
the monitoring and financing issues concurrently as reasons for investment distortions and 
recommending a balancing mechanism as implications. Governments should focus more 
on the development of the financial system, which is characterized by capacity building of 
financial institutions and markets in terms of activity, size and efficiency. Taking steps in 
improving the monitoring and financing ability of country’s financial institutions and mar-
kets will result in the betterment of economy of businesses and smoothing the management. 
Achievement of this goal would also need the development of the legal system. Although 
the study was conducted on the Chinese economy, its conclusion can serve a guide to all the 
developing economies. Results can be made more generalized by comparing the corporate 
investment with the financial development of a number of countries. Moreover, how does 
financial structure impact the investment distortions of firms in economies? We leave this 
question for future researchers.
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